Monday, February 20, 2006

The Need to Think Small

It was about 7.00 a.m. Washington time, but I wanted to talk to Andrew.

An adherent to the work ethic, he was awake, dressed, and dealing with correspondence.


"What's up, Commander," he asked cheerfully, referring to my dubious Naval rank.


"I know all my friends back in America think that I've become some suspect European, and I have to admit that day after day of listening to essentially anti-American newscasts makes one a bit critical, but occasionally there are a few grains of truth among the chaff," I began.


"Anything's possible," Andrew said.


"You know that Americans are accused of being simplistic: my country right or wrong; if you're not for us, you're against us, and all that."


"Go on," Andrew said.


"Well, I'm coming to think that this is true - at least in the case of dealing with rather a lot of countries," I said. "The trouble is that there is trouble seeing beyond the first label. It doesn't matter what it is, but the label sticks, and it appears that policy is made according to the label."


"Go on," Andrew repeated.


"I don't know if it's politicians or the news media, but the desire to talk about foreign policy seems based on the idea that everyone on a country or region is the same.


"You know well enough, Andrew, that anything - ANYTHING - you can make up about America is probably true about ten million people, but it wouldn't be fair to judge the nation on that criteria.


"I think the same is true of America's perception - or portrayal - of other countries," I said. "The need to present the big picture hides the ultimate truths that can only be seen in detail."


"For example?" Andrew asked.


"Okay," I began, "Recent American history seems to demonstrate that there is no appreciation - or even concept - of the role of tribalism in the world. Just because most of the US has amalgamated, more or less, doesn't mean that this has happened elsewhere. Look at the problems in Africa: modern national boundaries have very little relationship to the ancient tribes. As a result, civil wars and serious corruption flourish.


"The same is true int he Balkans," I pressed on. "The US had little idea of the tribal influences at play there - or what it takes to suppress those influences. The same is true in Afghanistan, Iraq and even Israel. Without appreciation of the myriad minorities, how can workable policies be formulated? Some of these people are genetically programmed never to agree with each other: rationality doesn't enter into it."


"That's a generalization," Andrew said.


"Yes, it is, but in this context, it is not without validity," I retorted.


"It seems to me," I said, "that the US would be better off forgetting the big picture once in a while and concentrating on the detail. I am sure that Washington had very little idea about the Mujahidin before it started giving them stinger missiles and teaching them how to make car bombs."


"I can't dispute that the intelligence was crap," Andrew said candidly.


"It was the same in Vietnam," I said. "We never understood the mentality, even when we were told."


"I well remember Fire in the Lake," Andrew said, referring to a brilliant book by a young Frances Fitzgerald which looked at the nature of the Vietnamese, their history and politics. It had been a best-seller, but hadn't changed American foreign policy. Not until Nixon decided that the way to get elected was to promise to end the war, which to his credit, he did.


"Could no one see Hamas winning in Palestine?" I challenged. "A people who had been suppressed for fifty-odd years and whose one real political party had failed to improve things significantly? Was it really that unexpected? If so, there should be hundreds of resignations from intelligence agencies and news media analysts's departments."


"How does thinking small help?" Andrew asked.


"I know the world has changed, but take a look at the Eisenhower administration: Ike only took big risks when the possible gains were big. He took small risks when the gains were small. We seem to have forgotten that principle and are taking enormous risks when the gains are very doubtful, indeed."


"You mean Iraq?"


"I mean Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korean, Iran - all those places where some creative thinking would bear real dividends. The US doesn't have to be confrontational. And before you say it, yes, there are some people who only understand tough action. Unfortunately, most of them are in America.


"People behave how they are treated. Every teacher knows that: treat students well, professionally, fairly - firmly, too - and they will respond in kind. Treat them as though they're about to attack you, and they won't disappoint that expectation, either."


"So you would advocate?"


"Finding out what things are really like in a country; find out what people really want - and talk to those who don't just want tanks, land mines, jets, missiles and rifles. Cut through the special interest groups and see what the needs really are. And don't confuse the message. Bombing the Taliban while dropping aid to the Afghan people just confused things, especially when the wrong people got the deliveries."


That's true enough," Andrew conceded.


"Most people just want to get on with their lives in peace, and we should be able to accept that they may not love us, or yearn for a democracy they cannot yet comprehend," I said.


"I feel like I'm being driven back to Emerson and Thoreau," Andrew said. "I'll let you know when I've reread some of them."


"Don't forget: The ink of the scholar is more sacred than the blood of the martyr."


"Did Emerson say that?" Andrew asked.


"No. Mohammed."